We examine the hypothesis that the severity of a recession favorably affects the rate of growth of output during the period immediately after the recession. Our empirical analysis is based on the behavior of industrial output in the G-7 countries during the period 1960 to 1985. We show that the depth of a recession, defined as the cumulative output loss between the peak and trough dates, is negatively comelated with growth in the first twelve months of the subsequent expansion.
Introduction
Is the course of an expansion hlluenced in any way by ttre character of the preceding recession? In panicular, does the economy "recover" from a recession and does the strength of this recovery depend in any way on the severity of the prior recession? In a pair of earlier papers (Wynne and Balke (1992 Balke ( , 1993 )> we investigated this issue using the chronology of business cycle peak and trough dates tlat the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) maintains for the United States. This chronology extends back through the mid-nineteenth century and dates peaks and troughs in economic activity on the basis of the cyclical behavior of a large number of series. These peak and trough dates, along with a measure of aggregate production, allowed us to investigate how certain characteristics of recessions in the United States may inJluence the course of subsequent expansions. We found that while neither the length nor the steepness of a recession was correlated with output growth in the flrst twelve months of a recovery, the cumulative output loss over the course of the recession was sigrrificantly negatively correlated with oulput growth over this horizon. We interpreted this finding as being consistent with the existence of a recovery or bounce-back effect.
The notion that there is a period of recovery that is distinct from the rest of an expansion is implicit in a variety of models of the business cycle. One of the earliest explicit statements of this idea in the academic litefature is Friedman (1969) , who asked whether "... the magnitude of an expansion [is] systematically related to the magnitude of the succeeding contraction? Does a boom tend on the average to be followed by a large contraction? A mild expansion, by a mild contraction? "(p.271). On the basis of simple rank correlation coefficients, he found no systematic connection between the size of an expansion and that of the subsequent contraction, but did find that "a large contraction in output tends to be followed on the average by a large business expansion; a mild contraction, by a mild expansion. " Friedman (1992) reiterated these findings and presented some additional evidence in support of his 'plucking model" of business fluctuations. Moore (1965) also pointed out that "...rates of increase during the initial stages of recovery [are] generally larger following severe contractions than following mild ones... [and] that initial rates of increase (during, say, the first six to twelve months) usually exceed those at any subsequent time during the business expansion...' 1p.503)
In a real business cycle model (see for example King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) and Kydland and Prescott (1982)) a recession cornes about as a result of some adverse real shock that knocks the economy away from its long run equilibrium growth path. Recovery ftorn the recession then follows lhe course of a return to steady state equilibrium. The dynamics of the recovery are essentially the same as the transitional dynamics of the standard neoclassical Solovian growth model. The economy grows more rapidly the further the capital stock is from its long run equilibrium level. Corsequently, large technology shocks that are absorbed in part by running down the capital stock should be followed by periods of rapid growth.
It is also common in both the academic and popular literature to see recessions referred to as 'purgative" episodes where "excesses" of one sort or another are 'cleansed" from the economy, and are followed by periods of rapid growth as a result of this cleansing. r Popular statements of this idea are Blinder (1984 Blinder ( ,1989 Blinder ( ,1991 , who tenned it tle "Joe Palooka' effect after a popular children's toy that bounced back with greater vigor the harder it was punched.
We investigate whether the strength of the recovery is influenced by the severity of the prior recession. Specifically, we consider the notion that the economy tends to bounce back from recessions -the more severe the recession, the more vigorous the recovery.2 In this paper we look at evidence for a sample of OECD countries (the G-7 countries) for the postwar pedod. We show that growth in the early stages of an expansion tends to be greater the more severe the preceding recession, where severity is measured as the cumulative oulput loss over the course of the recession. One innovation in this paper is that we examine the recession-recovery relatiorship using data on growth cycles rather than business cycles. The distirrction between the two concepts is simple: business cycles are fluctuations in the absolute level of activity, whereas growth cycles refer to fluctuations about trend.3
Dating business cycles
The empirical strategy followed in this paper to test for the existence of a bounce back effect considers individual recessions and recoveries as the basic unit of observation and employs a simple regression model that allows us to distinguish between various measures of the severity of a recession. The first requirement of this approach, then, is a chronology of peak and trough dates that mark the beginning and end of recessions. As already mentioned, 6. The clusters of dates, the median dates, and the composite index dates are inspected, and a decision is made on which rnonthly date best represents the consensus. These dates are the growth cycle peaks and troughs. "(Moore and Zarnow ft.2, 1986, pp.1 7 2-7 7 6) The NBER/CIBCR growth cycle chronology for the G-7 countries is shown in Table   1 . Sorne comments are in order. The chronology in Table 1 Table 2 . The OECD chronology distinguishes between major and minor cycles: the dates of the latter are shaded in the table. The distinction between the two is that only tle major cycle dates are used in the trend elimination procedure. The OECD chronology for the G-7 countries consists of fifty growth recessions, including sixteen 'minor" recessions.
The dates correspond reasonably closely with those identified in the NBER chronology: the conforrnity is highest for the United Kingdom and Japan, and lowest for France.
Since the OECD dates only run through the early 1980's we decided to supplement ttris chronology with dates of our own for the period since then. Our approach was to pick peak and trough dates using the Bry-Boschan business cycle dating algorithm applied to Hodrick-Prescott filtered (log) industrial production series for each country. These dates are reported in panel B of Table 2 . The Bry-Boschan algorithm also formed the basis of the OECD dating procedure (OECD 1997, p.27). The results reported below are robust to the exclusion of these dates form our analysis.
In the empirical work below we will report results for botl the NBER and OECD growth cycle dates.
Is there a recovery?
The notion of a recovery, and indeed the name, suggests a response or adjusunent to periods of recession. Not all conceptions of lhe business cycle necessarily imply a recovery.
For example, if recessions and expansions are draws from a two-state Markov model as in Hamilton (1989) , then the notion of a recovery is not empirically relevant. In this section, we present some evidence suggesting that output behaves differently immediately after a recession than during other periods of an expansion.
As we noted above, we decided to examine the bounce-back hypothesis for tle G-7 countries using growth cycles rather than classical NBER business cycles for the simple reason that business cycle chronologies do not exist for countries other than the United States. For the United States, for which we have both a business cycle chronology and a growth cycle chronology it is interesting to compare the two. This comparison is shown in Table 3 . A number of points are worth noting. First, and unsurprisingly, there arc more 6 growth cycles than there are business cycles during the period covered by the two chronologies (twelve growth cycles versus nine business cycles). The 1980-81 business cycle recovery is included in the 1978-82 slowdown in the growth cycle chronology. Note that the trough dates in the business cycle chronology tend to match troughs in the growth cycle chronology, with only two exceptions: the 1954 growth cycle trough comes 3 months after the corresponding business cycle trough, and the 1982 growth cycle trough is I month after the business cycle trough. Growth cycle peaks, on the other hand, tend to consistently precede business cycle peaks, by an average ofjust under 5 montbs. A priori we would expect that growth cycle peaks would precede business cycle peaks, and ttrat growth cycle troughs would come later than business cycle troughs. The fact that the growth cycle troughs tend to coincide with business cycle troughs tells us something about the "shape" of the business cycle. Specifically, growth in the early stages of an expansion must be relatively rapid compared to the rest of the exparsion for the trough dates of business cycles and growth cycles to coincide. That is, expansions begin with periods of strong growth. If ilrstead the growth rate tended to accelerate over the course of the expansion, we would be more likely to see the growth cycle trough coming a lot later than the business cycle trough.
This phenomenon of rapid growth in the early stages of an expansion has bee noted by other authors, including Emery and Koenig(1992) and Sichel (1992). Elsewhere we have examined this phenomenon in more detail (see Balke and Wynne (1992) ). Figure I illustrates the average monthly grovitl rate over different phases of the growth cycle for each of the G-7 countries and all of them combined. For each country, the figure shows the average monthly growth rate of industrial production from peak to peak (labeled r), the average monthly growth between the peak and ffough dates (s), the average montl y growth rate in the first twelve months of tle expansion (g), and the average montlly growth rate in the rest of the expansion (h). Note that in every case the average rate of $owth in the first twelve months of expansion is consistently higher than the growth rate in the rest of the expansion. Furthermore, growth in the first twelve montls of the expansion is also greater than tlre peak-to-peak growth rate, which can be considered an estimate of trend growth. The figure is certainly suggestive of the existence of a period of rapid growth ilr the irnmediate aftermath of a recession that might in some way be influenced by characteristics of the recession. We term this a bounce-back effect, and in the next section we investigate its nature.
The bounce-back effect
To test for the existence of a bounce-back effect, we consider a simple empirical model that expresses output growth in the early stages of an expansion as a function of three characteristics of the preceding recession. The variables we consider are measures of the depth, length and steepness of the recession. This builds on rezults reported in a pair of earlier papers (Wynne and Balke (1992 Balke ( ,1993 )) where we looked at growth during the first twelve months of an expansion as a function of the cumulative output decline over the course of the prior recession using U.S. industrial production data.
Empirical model
The model estimated in Wynne and Balke (1992) related (cumulative) growth during the first k months of an expansion to the (cumulative) decline in output over the course of the prior recession. This can be written in log terms as (!r,_r -!r,) = oo + ar(Ti -P,) , ur(!r, -!r,) , ,,
where y, denotes the log of output at date t, P, is the date of the peak denoting the omet of tle i 'th recession, I, is the date of the trough denoting the end of the i'th recession, Z+ fr is t months after the trough date of the i'th recession, e, is an error term (assumed to have the usual properties) and ao, up a2 are parameters to be estimated.
This equation can be rewritten as k S,G) = uo + ar(T, -P,) + uS,(T, -P,) + e.
where g,(k) is the average monttly growth rate during the first ft months of the expansion and s, is the average monthly change in output over the course of the i'th recession. It is useful to think of s, as a measure of the "steepness" of the decline in output over tle course of a recession. The 'depth' of the recession, as measured by the difference berween output at the peak and trough dates, can be written as d, = s17,-pS. This model in turn suggests a more general model of the form S1(D = co * drri * ar(7, -P) + ars,({ -P) + e, This model relates growth in the first & months of an expansion to three characteristics of the prior recession, namely the steepness of the recession as measured by s,, its length as measured by (7,-P), and its depth as measured by d, = s{7,-P) . Under the hypothesis that the severity of a recession favorably affects the rate of output growth immediately after the recession, we would expect some or all of the estimated coefficients ct, d2, c3 to be significant. If the dimension of severity that matters is the steepness of the recession, we would expect dr < 0. If instead it is the length that matters, we would expect that a, > 0.
If what matters is the cumulative output decline over the course of recession (so that the "cleansing effect" of a short sharp recession is identical to that of a long shallow recession) then we would expect o. < 0.
4,2 Results for the G-7 countries
In our earlier studies of the bounce-back effect for the United States, we focused on the behavior of industrial production during and after recessions primarily because of the To test for the bounce-back phenomenon across countries, we focus€d on the G-7 l0 group of industrial nations. An immediate concem when pooling tle observations from these countries for the postwar period is the potential effect of the radically different secular growh rates during this period. For this reason we decided to conftol for trend growth rates in all of the basic regressions, yielding tle following empirical model specification:
C{k) = at * crsi * az(Tt -P) + d3si(Ti -P) + aor, + 6, where r, is the trend rate of growth during the i'tl cycle, defined as the average rate of growth from peak to peak. Defining the trend rate of growth in this way allows for changes in the trend growth rate over time. A priori we expect that ao > 0. Table 4 between the length of a downturn and the strength of the subsequent recovery was also noted by OECD (f992) for a shorter sample than that considered here and using GDP as the measure of aggregate activity. Table 5 reports the results obtained from estimating the same models using the OECD business cycle dates instead of the NBER dates. Note that now the depth variable on its own has absolutely no ability to explain growth in the first twelve months of an expansion. When the depth variable is augmented with the trend growth variable, it becomes significant at the five percent level. As with the NBER chronology, neitler the steepness nor the length vaxiables have any explanatory power. In general the results obtained using the OECD dates are somewhat weaker than those obtained usins the NBER dates.T
Conclusions
In this paper we prcsented evidence supporting the notion that economies experience a bounce-back effect following recessions. We focused on the behavior of industrial production in the G-7 countries during the postwar period, and found that the depth of the recession bore a statistically significant (and negative) relationship to growth in the twelve month period following the end of the recession. We also examined measures of "steepness" and of length of a recession, where the former is defined as the average monthly growth rate of ouput over the course of the recession, and the latter is simply the number of months between the peak and trough dates. Neither variable was found to be significant when considered in conjunction with the depth variable, confirming our earlier results for the United States.
The irnmediate policy implications of our results are not so obvious, as we have not examined how the strength of the bounce-back effect is influenced by policy variables such as interest rates, govemment spending or tax rates. It is arguable that the existence of a relationship between growtl in the early stages of a recovery and the severity of the preceding recession may reflect some sort of self correction mechanism at work. It is equally arguable that rapid growth may reflect a vigorous policy response initiated as a result of the severity of the preceding recession. The rezults presented above do not allow us to discriminate between these competing views of recoveries, but hopefully may encourage further investigation of these competing hypotheses. s However, the results in this paper, when considered in combination with the results in our earlier pap€rs, suggest tle existence of an interesting empirical phenomenon that may be useful in evaluating business cycle models. Elsewhere @alke and Wynne (1995)), we have examined the ability of a prototypical real business cycle model to reproduce the bounce back phenomenon, and found that typically the relationship is stronger empirically than can be generated in reasonable parameterizations of real business cycle models. Table l . * denotes significanco at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5,6 level; *** denotes significance at the I % level. St{ndard eaaols arE in parentheses.
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